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TV talk in PNG: A search 
for policy in a weak state 
The reasons for the nation-state's weakness are many, but the 
course of TV talk over the last 10 years in Papua New Guinea reveals 
one reason in particular: the sacrifice of long-term state-building to 
the immediate demands of electoral strategy. 
By ROBERT J. FOSTER 
M Y E F F O R T to formulate a coherent national communication policy 
does not imply that no policies in this area exist. The communication 
system in Papua N e w Guinea would have evolved over a period of time 
with ad hoc policy decisions being taken as necessary in the light of 
political considerations and technological innovations. Whilst there has 
been laws governing communications activities, policies have not been 
clearly articulated, but were rooted in tradition and precedent. 
— Martin Thompson, Minister for Information and Communication 
Services, December 1993 (PNG 1993: v). 
Television in its various forms is already in Papua N e w Guinea, but it is 
in a chaotic and most unsatisfactory state. None of them can be 
considered or accepted as promoting Papua N e w Guinea cultural values. 
Because of lack of adequate television policies by successive govern-
ments, a situation has been reached in Papua N e w Guinea that would not 
be tolerated in most other countries. 
— Brown Sinamoi, Communications Minister, speaking at the Pacific 
Regional Television Conference in Suva, November 1989 (cited in 
Stewart et. al. 1993:351). 
Television in various forms is already here in Papua N e w Guinea but it 
is in achaotic and most unsatisfactory state. Because of a lack of adequate 
television development policies by successive Governments, a situation 
has been reached in Papua N e w Guinea that just would not be tolerated 
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in most other countries. The situation has been aggravated by entrepre-
neurial organisations taking advantage of the lack of policy to build up 
systems that cannot be readily dismantled. In this policy vacuum, without 
clear standards applying, literally hundreds of satellite receivers have 
been installed with cable systems criss-crossing nearly all urban centres, 
often being unsightly and in some cases plainly hazardous. 
— The Report of the Board of Inquiry into Broadcasting (Including 
Television) in Papua New Guinea, January 1987 (PNG 1987:94). 
FROM 1985 to 1994, all efforts to formulate a national communication policy 
for Papua N e w Guinea bore the indelible stamp of commercial interests and/or 
electoral strategies. I will underscore this claim, which is itself hardly new, by 
recounting the attempts of two separate Governments of Paias Wingti to take up 
the issue of media regulation — especially the state's regulation of broadcast 
television (see Horsfield 1990; Wilson 1993; Thomas 1994). In so doing, I will 
also identify some of the recurrent themes that shape T V talk in P N G — mostly 
the talk of politicians, church representatives, local academics and media 
personnel, but also, here and there, the talk of ordinary citizens. These themes 
emerge in discussions about program content, on the one hand, and questions of 
economic and cultural dependency, on the other. M y review brings together 
material from various published and unpublished accounts of television in P N G : 
newspaper reports, official inquiries, scholarly papers, and so forth. This 
literature is surprisingly small, given that commercial broadcast television has 
been operating continuously and on an ever increasing scale in Papua N e w 
Guinea since January, 1987. Anthropologists like myself ought to pay close 
attention to the sad fact that intensive field research on television viewing 
remains virtually non-existent. M y orientation is therefore prospective; I aim 
to assemble preliminary notes for a historical ethnography of television broad-
casting and reception in Papua N e w Guinea. 
Launching broadcast television in PNG: The political context 
Commercial television broadcasting in P N G commenced in January 1987 after 
six months of public debate, legislative maneuvers and, ultimately, court orders. 
The noise accompanying its arrival contrasted starkly with the silence surround-
ing the Somare Government's efforts in 1984 to grant broadcasting licences to 
foreign commercial companies, efforts "characterised by minimal public debate 
and apparent irregularities at the level of negotiation" (Stewart et. al. 1993:339). 
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Not only was the decision to issue the licences a reversal of pre vious government 
inquiries into the feasibility and advisability of television—all of which deemed 
television a low priority for economic development and desirable, if at all, 
mainly for educational purposes (see Horsfield 1990 for details) — b u t the 
decision was also taken in direct contravention of the recommendations of the 
Post and Telecommunications (PTC) Department, the local licensing authority. 
Stewart et. al. (1993: 339) observe that when the Department advised the 
Government that controls were needed in the form of a broadcasting tribunal, 
the Department was replaced by an "interdepartmental committee set up 
especially to make recommendations to cabinet on the introduction of televi-
sion." (The chronology in the Kalo Report [PNG 1987], however, suggests that 
the interdepartmental committee was formed in response to a request from P T C 
to the National Executive Council [NEC] for policy guidelines.) W h e n it too 
recommended to proceed cautiously and to set up a tribunal, this committee was 
in turn replaced by "a special state negotiating team" that consisted of the 
departments of the Prime Minister, Finance and Planning, and the State Solicitor 
(Ibid.;PNG 1987:96). Accordingly, in November 1984, Cabinet directed Posts 
and Telecommunications to issue a licence to Niugini Television Network (a 
joint venture with Newcastle Broadcasting Network, a subsidiary of the Perth-
based Parry Corporation). 
In the same month, a second company, Media Niugini Pty. Ltd., began 
showing locally produced videos in the major market places of the National 
Capital District. The following year, Media Niugini, eventually restructured as 
a joint venture with Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd., a subsidiary of Kerry 
Packer's Nine Network Australia, applied to P T C for licenses for television 
services. T w o days before the Somare Government fell in 1988 — and months 
before the details of its merger with Packer's P B L were finalised and publicised 
— Media Niugini was granted a licence to begin commercial television 
broadcasting (Post Courier, 20 November 1985). 
The change of government in 1985 (in November, with third no-confidence 
vote of the year) and the declaration of Paias Wingti as prime minister recast the 
issue of broadcast television as a matter of public debate. Wingti's disagreement 
with Somare over the appropriateness of introducing broadcast television to 
P N G apparently had contributed to Wingti's defection from Pangu Pati in early 
1985. Wingti, then Deputy Prime Minister, was not present at the Cabinet 
meeting in which the decision was taken to license N T N . Subsequently, as 
leader of the opposition, Wingti alleged in Parliament that "two senior govern-
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ment officials regularly conveyed confidential information relating to Cabinet 
discussions and deliberations to the representatives of Newcastle Broadcasting 
Network" (Stewart et. al. 1993:340). In addition, allegations were made that Sir 
Ebia Olewale, former Deputy Prime Minister and a friend of Somare's, had been 
given a 10 per cent share of N T N in order to ease the new company's passage 
through Cabinet (Stewart et. al 1993:340; Horsfield 1990: 158). Horsfield 
(1990:158) concludes that these allegations "added to the problems of a 
government already in a crisis of corruption allegations, and therefore the 
television issue was a contributing factor in bringing the Somare government 
down." 
In January 1986, Wingti's Communications Minister, Gabriel Ramoi, told 
the Post-Courier that "Television should only become a priority area when it 
can be used to develop anational and cultural consciousness. This can only be 
done if the State is involved in control over the medium either as owner or in the 
area of legislative control" (Post-Courier, 13 January 1986). In February, the 
Government announced an inquiry into broadcasting, both radio and television, 
that would provide the basis for making official media policy. As a result, the 
licences of N T N and Media Niugini were renewed in March only until 
November, by which time the result of the inquiry would be known (PNG 
1994:2; but an ad for N T N from 1986 asserts that P T C renewed NTN's licence 
for one year on 30 Mayl986 [Times of PNG, 18 July 1986]). The N E C 
established the membership of the Board of Inquiry into Broadcasting and its 
Terms of Reference in July (PNG 1987:1). At the same time, Wingti requested 
N T N not to start broadcasting on its planned date of July 18, but instead to wait 
until the outcome of the inquiry was known. N T N refused, took the Government 
to court, and thereby precipitated two separate legislative attempts by the Wingti 
Government to delay broadcast television (a strategy to which Wingti had 
resorted the year before as leader of the opposition). Both attempts were 
declared invalid by the courts, paving the way for N T N to begin broadcasting 
in January 1987, the month in which the Board of Inquiry presented its findings. 
Media Niugini, by then renamed E M T V (Tok Pisin for "It's TV " ) , began 
broadcasting six months later in July. At the time, its ownership was announced 
as 25 per cent Peter Sam, a P N G lawyer; 25 per cent Alun Beck, a N e w Zealander 
who ran a video production company in P N G ; and 50 per cent Bond Media, 
owned by Australian businessman Alan Bond, who had acquired Packer's 
Publishing and Broadcasting Ltd. when he bought out the Nine Network. By the 
end of 1989, Bond Media had increased its share of E M T V to 90 per cent 
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(Dorney 1990:238). Today, E M T V is the only station broadcasting in P N G 
(NTN folded after one year of operations due to Kevin Parry's financial 
troubles). Through its parent company P B L Pacific Television Pty. Ltd., it is 
100 per cent owned by the Nine Network Australia, which is itself back in the 
hands of media mogul Kerry Packer. According to a 1994 report, "the station 
employs around 70 Papua N e w Guineans and does produce some of its own 
material, though only around 12 per cent of total broadcast time" (PNG 1994:3). 
E M T V has gradually expanded its broadcasting from Port Moresby, first to 
other provincial capitals via terrestrial broadcast, then to the whole country via 
the Indonesian Palapa B2P satellite and, more recently, via the Russian Gorizont 
satellite. By the station's own current estimates, E M T V is now available to 
approximately 1.7 to 2 million Papua N e w Guineans. 
Debating TV in 1985-86: Positions 
During the course of events that I have just traced, numerous individuals and 
agencies — politicians, journalists, church representatives, and the television 
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companies themselves — staked out various positions on the issue of television 
in P N G . Their statements, several of which I adduce here, define themes that 
have shaped and continue to shape T V talk in P N G . 
Paias Wingthln August of 1986, Prime Minister Paias Wingti published 
a commentary in the weekly Times of Papua New Guinea under the heading "TV 
must be used to serve the nation" (Wingti 1986). The commentary expresses his 
opposition to the introduction of broadcast television in P N G , but progressively 
narrows that opposition to the introduction now of television with foreign 
programmes. Wingti's rhetoric deploys a number of interrelated oppositions 
and a heavy emphasis on "our cultures" that pervade T V talk in P N G : 
Rural Majority/Urban Minority: Wingti contrasts the interests of the few 
with those of the many, that is, the interests of a "few powerful and vocal people" 
with those of the masses or T H E people. Wingti contends that a few people, 
implicitly urbanites, are out to confuse or mislead the people in general, and that 
his leadership, which stands for "the silent rural majority," is determined to stop 
them. 
Foreign/National: The powerful minority, Wingti suggests, consists of "a 
group of non-citizens and a few Papua N e w Guineans, who have a vested 
interest in television broadcasting." This "handful of Papua N e w Guineans" is 
particularly loathsome inasmuch as they are cultural traitors who "seem to have 
a contempt for their own culture, and favour foreign things." 
Material Gain/Cultural Preservation: Wingti contrasts "passing material 
gain" with "our ancient heritage," claiming that the sacrifice of the latter for the 
former is at stake. This contrast might imply that the powerful minority is 
motivated by greed, but it addresses another issue more explicitly, namely, the 
issue of economic development: "There are people who claim that by our failing 
to introduce television now, some jobs will be lost, that people will be 
unemployed. It is a sad fact that some jobs in television may be lost. But what 
are these few jobs lost to be compared to the loss of our culture, our heritage, or 
way of life. N o money can buy back our languages once they are lost, and no 
jobs or money can replace our cultural heritage once it is destroyed." 
Wingti also proposes, as an alternative to television with foreign programs, 
the use of television as an instrument for creating a national culture based on 
unity in diversity. In this view, television would function as a way of educating 
the diverse groups within P N G about each other's traditions: "Before we, as a 
people of one nation can respect one another, we must know one another's ways. 
This is not going to happen if foreign programs, and foreign movies become the 
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Ionly common factor that we experience 
through watching television." Hence, the 
opposition between foreign and national is 
shorthand for both an opposition between 
material gain and cultural heritage and an 
opposition between foreign culture and a 
national culture comprised of diverse local 
traditions. 
Deceptive Images/Honest Work: Wingti 
deploys one other opposition in his rhetoric 
which, though somewhat idiosyncratic, is 
consistent with the Protestant ethics implicit 
in his material/cultural dualism. This oppo-
sition contrasts the torpor and escapism of 
those who "withdraw from their real envi-
ronment and lock their minds on to the magic 
screen" with the man who lives "by the 
sweat of his brow, and the fruit of his la-
bours, not by viewing the images of another 
world and another life which can never be 
his unless he works for it to become real." Michael S mare: As Wingti attemptedto use the legislatu e to delay NTN's broad-casts, opposition leader Michael S mare tr ssed hat he agreement b tween N T N and the State w s legally binding: N T N wa  to b gin broadcasting wi hitwelve months from S ptember 1985, wh n the ag eement was sig ed (T m sof P G, 18 July 1986). Somare also reaffirm d his supp  fo  th  n roduc ioel vision: '"Mr. Wingti is being mo ona bout the entir is u ,' he said, adding his suppo t fo TV' 'com u a ion and ducat al v lue'—  rigi l pr poser to Cabin t of the N T N submi n" (Ibi .). Inde , S m rew s an a paren ly enthusias c supp rte of intro ucing b o dc st televisi n toP N G o ce h conc rns about costs ( ee Pacif c I lands M nth y 1984) wllayed by e s - all d o c st r po  p ented by the f re gn l v sionentrepren u (i.e., p os s to pay all capita  co n t r s  r  thr ugh ommercial adve tisi g). He i qu ted by S wart e . al. (1993:346) a say g i arliame t n ay, 1985 tha "The c m y ll y n  u [t levis on] inr M re by, La , Mt. H g n  Gor k . I w h h y lud W w kPACIFICJOURNALISM REVIEW 5:1 1998 59
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[center of Somare's own East Sepik electorate] because I would really love it, 
but they did not." 
I have not yet found any single statement by Somare or his Pangu Pati 
staking out their position on television. Horsfield (1990) suggests that I would 
be unlikely to find such a statement inasmuch as Somare, and his Pangu Pati, 
acted mainly out of economic pragmatism rather than on ideological principles. 
(Of course, after the defection from Pangu of Wingti and other apparent "left 
nationalists" to form the People's Democratic Movement in 1985, such eco-
nomic pragmatism was more pronounced (see chapter two of Thompson and 
MacWilliam 1992).) Hence she speculates that Somare's decision to hasten the 
introduction of television in 1985 was prompted mainly by electoral concerns 
(such as giving P N G the gift of television on its tenth anniversary of independ-
ence and using television as a means for social control of the pressing law and 
order problem). Nonetheless, Stewart et. al. (1993: 347) have inferred from 
transcripts of debates in Parliament five reasons that Somare and then C o m m u -
nications Minister Roy Evara offered as justification for granting a licence to 
NTN: 
1. The service would offer a large amount of programing in education and 
health issues. 
2. The service would steadily increase its level of local content, beginning 
at 20 per cent. 
3. Ownership of the network would be majority Papua N e w Guinea. 
4. The service would be introduced at no cost to the government. (But see 
Horsfield 1990:157 about the agreement of the government to buy the necessary 
transponders and lease them to NTN.) 
5. "Television is already in Papua N e w Guinea" in the form of cable, video, 
and satellite; a broadcast service, however, would be regulated in contrast with 
these other services. (The latter implication is not demonstrated by Stewart et. 
al.; it might be the case that Somare implied, like N T N itself [see below], that 
television was already in P N G , but only available to a privileged minority.) 
It is perhaps reflective of their different orientations to post-colonialism that 
unlike Wingti, Somare gave no prominence to the issue of custom or tradition 
in talking about T V in P N G . For Somare, the main issue appeared to have been 
one of attracting foreign investment, not of cultural autonomy (see Horsfield 
1990 for discussion of these two different orientations). 
Gabriel Ramoi: Gabriel Ramoi, Minister for Communications in Wingti's 
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cabinet, authored a Government announcement that ran in the Times of Papua 
New Guinea in August 1986 (Ramoi, 1986). Not surprisingly, Ramoi reiterated 
many of the points made in Wingti's commentary, juxtaposing the interests of 
the majority against those of the "privileged few" and even going so far as to 
characterise Somare, "our own Father of Independence," as "a mouthpiece for 
foreign interests in the country." In particular, Ramoi emphasised the contrast 
between the relatively affluent urban minority and the poorer rural majority: 
... while we can project that a fee of K50 for say 200,000 sets would yield 
a revenue of K10 million per year, it is only the urban population that can 
afford to pay such a licence fee and it is not at all clear that they would be 
willing to subsidise programing aimed at the interests of the rural sector. 
W e must not forget that more than 85 per cent of the population live in the 
rural area and have very limited incomes. This means that they will not 
be able to pay a licence fee nor will they be buying a television set. 
Ramoi's concern for the rural majority, however, focused less on the threat 
television might pose to "ancient heritages" and more on the capacity of the rural 
population to become involved in local programing. Ramoi's specific sugges-
tion in this regard was to delay the advent of broadcast television until the 
expertise needed for producing local programing was acquired through the 
making of "participative videos" documenting successful development projects 
in small rural communities. In other words, Ramoi's objection to foreign 
programs was made less on the grounds of their content and more on the grounds 
that they precluded the development of a television industry that involved all 
Papua N e w Guineans: "Many of the proposals so far have been very vague when 
it comes to questions about local programme production, about adequate 
training for staff in terms of community life in P N G , about appropriate language 
use, and about a balanced spread of viewing opportunities among the population 
as a whole." In sum, Ramoi asserted that it is "the responsibility of the 
Government to ensure that mass broadcasting like television promotes national 
development objectives." The alternative to such control, Ramoi said, was to 
let television broadcasting "go its own way aimlessly spreading commercial and 
cultural exploration [sic? exploitation?]." 
Niugini Television Network: O n the day that N T N had planned to begin 
broadcasting, the network ran a two-page ad in the Times of Papua New Guinea 
(18 July 1986). The ad described "the situation" from the point of view of N T N , 
noting that an estimated 20,000 television sets were already in P N G and over 
250 hours of television via cable and satellite were available to viewers in Port 
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Moresby alone. The ad then claimed that "Parliament House has two satellite 
dishes for television reception wired to the amenities room and the members 
bar" and that "several cabinet ministers are receiving television at their homes 
viacable or satellite." By implication, then, television was an amenity currently 
enjoyed by those politicians w ho sought to prevent the less privileged from 
enjoying ("free") broadcast television. That is, the network, like Wingti and 
Ramoi, rhetorically deployed an opposition between the elite and the masses, 
but in order to challenge rather than support the claim that the government 
served the interests of the majority. 
The reproduced remarks of Sir Ebia Olewale, chairman of N T N , developed 
the implications of NTN's description of "the situation." Sir Ebia's words were 
reported to express "his sadness and concern for the right of individuals affected 
by the Government's abrupt intervention into Broadcast Television." Sir Ebia's 
comments are worth quoting in their entirety: 
There are many Papua New Guinea people who have joined the industry, 
who wish to learn and have a contribution. The Government's decision 
sweeps them aside. This is a democracy. The rights of the individual 
must be respected, as well as the interests of the State. There are the 
wishes of the people to consider, as well as the support of all the eminent 
men and women who have spoken in favour of Television. The culture 
of Papua New Guinea will not be destroyed by Television. It will bring 
the Nation together. The people will learn about each other's customs. 
Ten years ago there were people who said we were not ready for 
Independence. Today they can be seen to be wrong. This Nation is now 
ready for Television. It is what the people want. 
The ad concludes with the salutation, "Papua N e w Guinea, We're With You," 
and the N T N logo, thereby raising the questions: w h o is and w h o speaks for 
Papua N e w Guinea—for "the people"? Sir Ebia's words address the issue of 
national culture, but they effectively focus the debate on the issue of the rights 
of the individual and the role of the state in a democratic society. They plead, 
in other words, for the entitlements of consumer-citizenship: equal opportunity 
to enjoy the consumption of freely accessible commodities. The denial of such 
consumption is attributed to a state that is either overstepping its legitimate 
authority or acting out of misplaced paternalism. Sir Ebia thus conjures the 
specter of censorship and loss of freedom, a spectre that was to hover closely 
above subsequent T V talk in P N G . 
Media Niugini: O n July 11, 1986, Media Niugini expanded its operation 
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from the markets of Port Moresby to a "nationwide network" that included 
markets in Lae, Mt. Hagen, O k Tedi and Rabaul, as well as sports and social 
clubs, hostels and educational establishments throughout P N G . This expansion 
marked a new stage in the effort "to educate and acclimatise P N G audiences for 
the arrival of broadcast television." The company, which described itself as 
"PNG's original community T V service" ( N C T V or Nationwide Community 
TV), announced its expansion in inserts to the Times of Papua New Guinea. The 
inserts — designed to attract advertisers — marketed the company's effort in 
terms of the same rural/urban, "grass roots'Vaffluent oppositions deployed by 
Wingti and Ramoi, but to very different ends. For example, the insert described 
the "unique concept" of "community television": "The concept of bringing 
television to the grass roots audiences in P N G is of course contrary to the usual 
format for introduction of television services, and it brings added responsibility 
to the programers. Under normal circumstances with broadcast Television the 
first audiences to receive television would be the more affluent sections of the 
community. With N C T V reaching directly down to the broad base of the 
community it is communicating with the audience that supports the largest 
segment of the retail markets from which the retail trade derives the major part 
of its income." N C T V stressed that marketplace viewers included not only 
urban residents, but also vendors who travel from rural areas: 'These people will 
not only carry the news back to the villages, but having sold their produce, will 
carry back bulk purchases of food and other supplies." In short, N C T V 
promoted the image of a nationwide consumer-democracy in which all citizens 
would have access to the images and commodities purveyed by television. 
These images would include not only entertainment, but also community 
service announcements: "As part of NCTV's commitment to community 
service the programmes also carry, free of charge, public service and commu-
nity announcements for charities and service clubs. There will also be Govern-
ment sponsored educational programmes such as the recently completed 
agricultural film on the prevention of coffee rust." In this way, Media Niugini, 
represented itself as serving the interests of the majority—including the rural 
majority—by not only making the amenity of television widely available, but 
also contributing responsibly to the Government's agenda of national develop-
ment. 
Three Contributors to the Times of PNG: A quick flip through the July 
and August 1986 pages of the Times of Papua New Guinea reveals support for 
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Wingti's position coming from a variety of sources. I simply note afew of those 
sources here, making no claim that they are either typical or representative of 
any "elite" perspective let alone larger public opinion. 
Ray Anere, political columnist for the Times and lecturer at U P N G , 
described a "battle between corporate actors and governments, the latter being 
the custodians of public interest." Invoking the Eight Aims and the egalitarian 
ideals of the constitution, Anere endorsed Wingti's attempt at administering 
television according to national goals and directive principles: " H o w can any 
government in P N G administer television broadcast if there is no legislation? In 
this respect the state would be powerless via-a-vis corporate influence in 
safeguarding local culture and interests and at the same time do economic justice 
to the companies if it did not have the backup of legislation?" (Times of PNG, 
18 July 1986). 
Sheldon Weeks, longtime educational researcher in P N G , doubted the 
claims for television's educational benefits: "Producing educational programmes 
for T V when we cannot even revise and produce new ones for radio sounds like 
a con (a fantasy sold to us by the promoters)." Weeks argued that television 
ought not be a high priority given the country's need for basic infrastructure, and 
that finances and resources for producing local educational programmes were 
unlikely to be made available. (Times of PNG, 22 August 1986) 
Fr. Dennis Rochford, M S C , expressed what might be taken to be the 
Churches' view of the matter, claiming that the "major worry" was the lack of 
legislation to enforce broadcasting quotas and standards: "There are more 
important values at risk in this issue. As Christians we are more concerned for 
persons and their development than we are for accommodating the entertain-
ment of a minority—even if there are 20,000 television receivers in P N G ! It 
would seem essential, against a background of cultural alienation, manipulation 
and exploitation to institute administrative bodies and policies capable of 
effectively monitoring and controlling the standards and quotas of foreign 
media groups." Much like Wingti, Rochford posed a choice between commer-
cial profit, on the one hand, and the interests of people, on the other. (Times of 
PNG, 22 August 1986) 
The Kalo Report: Program content and public opinion 
The Report of the Board of Inquiry into Broadcasting (Including Television) 
(PNG 1987), chaired by Sir Kwamalo Kalo, presented findings^that, not 
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surprisingly, echoed the views and concerns of Wingti and Ramoi. For example, 
of the 17 terms of reference that it was charged to consider, the Board concluded 
that Term of Reference Number 13, reproduced here, "indicates the fundamen-
tal objectives of broadcasting in our nation" (PNG 1987:10): 
(13) The reflection in broadcasting and television of the multi-cultural 
nature of P N G society; the recognition of regional, sectional and minority 
interests in the structure of broadcasting and television in programme 
design, including provision of opportunities for access to broadcasting 
and television, and further including the recruitment and training of staff 
of television operators. 
Nevertheless, the report documents that the many people interviewed by the 
Board — a total of 1338 persons and organizations consulted through written 
submissions and public hearings in eight major towns — talked about T V in 
other terms. Specifically, the report claims that "during the course of the 
Inquiry, the Board heard in virtually every place visited, expressions of deep 
concern about the effects of foreign programmes on our society" (PNG 1987: 
100). And, in fact, the report devotes more attention to its recommendations on 
program content (Terms of Reference 15, 16 and 17) than it does to the 
"fundamental" Term 13. What is at stake here, then, is not only or even mainly 
a concern with foreign imports as a threat to local cultures, but more urgently 
a concern for the behavioral effects of viewing violent and obscene foreign 
programs. Given that the Board conducted its inquiry against a growing sense 
of lawlessness and disorder in urban P N G — a n d the actual declaration of a State 
of Emergency in Port Moresby in 1985 —this response is not extraordinary. I 
emphasise it for two reasons. 
First, the Kalo report itself suggests that the issue of regulating violence on 
television exposed a rift between N T N and Media Niugini, on the one hand, and 
the witnesses that came before the Board: 
Both companies treated the violent program issue on the basis that self-
regulation, as prevails in Australia, should be accepted in Papua N e w Guinea. 
Virtually all other witnesses to appear before the Board disagreed with the above 
and demanded that proper and timely controls on program content be introduced 
(PNG 1987:104). 
It was precisely these observations that precede one of the Board's most 
important and controversial recommendations, namely, that strict program 
regulation be a function assumed by a Broadcasting Tribunal established 
through government subsidy and funds from commercial broadcasting services 
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( P N G 1987: 100; see also p. 28). 
Second, the issue of how viewing violent programmes might affect audi-
ences, especially children and teenagers, seems to preoccupy the category of 
people w h o m it might please to refer to themselves as "grass roots" — that is, 
people who are neither politicians nor bureaucrats nor university lecturers. Put 
otherwise, concern over the harmful effects of viewing seems to eclipse issues 
of economic development and cultural autonomy for at least some of the people 
talking about T V in P N G . Here I tread cautiously, wary not to presume or 
promote the same romantic vision of "the people" that Wingti and Ramoi 
sometimes conjured in their evocations of "the silent rural majority." I do not 
have access to transcripts of the actual public hearings held by the Board of 
Inquiry, and I am well aware of the strong representation of Christian church 
interests on the Board. I simply note that the following views were attributed 
by the Kalo Report to a large proportion of the diverse group of people 
interviewed by the Board: 
The importance of religion to Papua New Guineans led many witnesses 
before the Board to urge an increase in religious broadcasts (PNG 
1987:52). 
In the course of this Inquiry, thejioard heard numerous submissions from 
a wide range of people and organisations, expressing deep concern over 
the amount of violence presented in television, and more particularly on 
pre-recorded video tapes (PNG 1987:59, original emphasis). 
As indicated in subsequent paragraphs the Board was inundated with 
pleas of deep concern from communities throughout the country over the 
uncontrolled and unremitting trade in violent, pornographic and sexist 
video tapes (PNG 1987:65). 
Is there any other basis, besides m y own intuition, on which to accept these 
generalizations as plausible? 
It would be easy, and probably correct, to assume that the Board of Inquiry' s 
findings articulate a style of T V talk inflected by the world view of Christian 
churches in P N G . For instance, Catalyst, the organ of the Melanesian Institute, 
a Christian pastoral outfit based in Goroka, published two articles critical of E M 
TV's programme content (Boorer 1990, reprinted from the Times of PNG; 
G e m o 1991). These articles linked violent programs to the use of shotguns in 
tribal fights and want-inducing advertisements to an increase in crime in towns 
and cities. Likewise, Sr. Maria Burke's (then director of the institute) contribu-
tion to the 1986 Waigani Seminar implicated television viewing as a cause of 
rascalism among youth. It stated furthermore that: 
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Television violence is dangerous in that it portrays an unacceptable social 
vice as being normal. Papua New Guinea village dwellers are not 
sophisticated in their approach to Western society and could easily be 
deceived into thinking that violence was an acceptable part of Western 
culture (1989:149). 
There is some evidence, however, that the concerns expressed in the report and 
in Catalyst reflected more widely held anxieties about television. (This perhaps 
should not come as a total surprise given the strong Christian values of many 
Papua N e w Guineans.) A n analysis of essays written by 77 teachers as part of 
the 1986 admissions test to U P N G ' s in-service B E d program revealed that 75 
per cent of the candidates felt television would have mostly negative social 
effects: 
People would become addicted to viewing; children would ignore par-
ents; the influence of the Church would be significantly reduced to the 
detriment of village life; programs showing sex, violence and other 
undesirable behaviour would cause social aisruption and teach rascalism; 
people would stop visiting each other; people would head for the urban 
attractions of towns (Boorer and Kiruhia 1989:157, emphasis added). 
Respondents also made a connection between advertising and crime: 
There was a general feeling that inappropriate material demands would 
be set up either by programs or by advertisements. Once these could not 
be satisfied by legitimate means a proportion of the population would 
inevitably turn to crime to do so. . . (Boorer and Kiruhia 1989:158). 
Similarly, the essays frequently expressed concern about the potential for 
intensifying social inequality between those w h o could afford television sets 
and those w h o could not. 
The results of the only ethnographic study of television viewing in P N G 
known to m e also confirms the outlook of the Kalo Report ( P N G 1994). Carried 
out by the Policy and Research Branch of the Department of Information and 
Communication in June, 1994, this study consisted of interviews with 20 
families (five of w h o m had cable/satellite T V ) , two women's groups, and one 
men's group from Hanuabada and Pari villages near Port Moresby. (It should 
be pointed out that both villages are described as "Christian villages" and 'very 
committed to their churches"; moreover, the interviewing team initially estab-
lished contact with the villages through their United Church pastors; in addition, 
Rev. Oria G e m o was at the time Asst. Sctry. (Policy and Research) of the Dept. 
of Information and Communication (see G e m o 1994).) Interestingly, the study 
notes that "we had a hard time explaining that w e were from a government 
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department and not from E M T V and that w e were therefore not in a position to 
change E M TV's programming, which was one of the major concerns ex-
pressed" (PNG 1994:5). Yet despite this and other admitted methodological 
limitations, the study usefully describes how and when villagers watched T V as 
well as what programs they watched. 
With regard to programs, the study claims that: 
Movies were also extremely popular an so was the new, locally produced, 
Christian programme, Sing With joy. The only complaint about Sing 
With Joy was that it was too short and that it ought not to be interrupted 
by commercials. A number of families were outright offended by 
commercials appearing in a Christian programme (PNG 1994:6). 
The majority of families expressed a desire for more Christian programmes; one 
elderly man is recorded as saying "I do not know why E M T V does not put on 
Bible programmes" ( P N G 1994:7). The majority also expressed a desire for 
more locally produced programs; indeed, the study is a pointed contradiction to 
E M TV's claim, reported by Stewart et. al. (1993:356), that "Papua N e w 
Guinean audiences prefer to watch overseas programs rather than local produc-
tions." But it is the views of the families on the potential effects of T V viewing 
that seem most in line with those of the Kalo Report: 
The general perception was that T V has a very strong effect on people's 
behaviour. Most families saw the escalated law and order problem in 
P N G as a direct result of T V and feared the influence of violent movies. 
An elderly woman said: "I do not like violent movies because they 
contribute to rascalism, rape and many other law and order related 
problems." 
A young man said: "If people are watching TV, they are learning from T V 
— instead of learning we are killing. People do what they see, steal, kill, 
etc." (PNG 1994:10). 
Not surprisingly, then, most families were supportive of the Censorship Board, 
some criticising it for not being strict enough. W o m e n , in particular, expressed 
concern over the difficulty of censoring what children watch, especially given 
that large groups of people, including the children of other people, would gather 
in a particular house to watch TV. 
What the Department of Information and Communication study reveals, 
among other things, is that T V talk in the villages of P N G is not wholly unlike 
T V talk in the towns and cities of the United States. People expressed 
dissatisfaction with the amount of advertising and anxiety over the harmful 
effects on children of viewing violent programs. Of course, there are differ-
68 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 5:1 1999 
PNG TV 
ences, and more complex issues about social relations and identities, consum-
erism, modernity and so forth that only ethnographically intensive studies will 
be able to elucidate (see, for example, the discussion of Chambri reactions to the 
popular Pepsi-sponsored music video program, Fizz, in Gewertz and Errington, 
1996). Like the report, I can only conclude, somewhat lamely, that more 
ethnographic research is needed. 
The Mass Media Tribunal: Exit Paias Wingti 
The frustrated efforts of the Wingti Government to prevent the unregulated 
broadcast of commercial T V in P N G culminated in Gabriel Ramoi's announce-
ment in November 1987 of his plans for a mass media tribunal. This tribunal, 
however, "would licence not just television, but all media — television, radio, 
the newspapers, magazines, videos and even outdoor advertising" (Dorney 
1990:238). The proposed Mass Media Tribunal Bill was, in the end, removed 
from the Parliamentary agenda before it reached the debating stage (see below). 
Although the bill presented itself as the direct outcome of the Kalo Report and 
outlined a philosophy of fundamental media rights, journalists' accounts of the 
bill tend to highlight three main points: 
1. "The Government would empower the tribunal to licence all media 
organisations. This licence would be renewed every so often after a public 
inquiry proved each organisation had carried out all the conditions of its licence" 
(Senge, 1988:21). 
2. 'The Government would require all foreign control in media firms to be 
50 per cent nationalised within 10 years. N o one individual or firm — whether 
foreign or national — could own more than 17 per cent of the Media" (Ibid.). 
(Dorney 1990:239 summarizes this point differently.) 
3. "... the tribunal would have the power to direct a licensee to publish 
matters that it (the tribunal) or the Minister for Communications deemed to be 
of national importance; and that the tribunal could direct a licensee not to publish 
matters that were prohibited by the censor, the tribunal, or the Minister" (Ibid.). 
Dorney (1990:239) adds that later the determination would lie with the Gover-
nor-General. 
Reaction to Ramoi's proposed bill seems to have come quickly and 
forcefully from the print media (whose activities were not the subject of the Kalo 
Report) and to have focused mainly on point number three, which was widely 
interpreted as a threat to the freedom of the press (for more detail see Senge 
1988- Dorney 1990; Robie 1995a; Layton 1988, 1993). For example, Oseah 
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Philemon, then a senior journalist and later the editor of the Post-Courier, 
PNG's largest newspaper, is quoted as saying that: 
A government that legislates to control the media is a government that 
does not want public scrutiny of its decisions. It is a government that does 
not intend to be accountable for its policies and actions (Senge 1988:22). 
Philemon's response is particularly significant inasmuch as he had earlier 
publicly supported the attempts of the Wingti Government to reassess the 
agreement to begin commercial broadcast television into P N G (Times of PNG, 
23 December 1985). Similarly, Leader of the Opposition, Michael Somare, 
characterised the bill as "dictatorial" and "suppressive," and said that "such a 
bill contravened section 46 of the Constitution on freedom of expression and 
was a 'trend towards guided democracy"' (Senge 1988:21-22). 
Ramoi himself defended the proposal — or, at least, the concept behind the 
proposal (Ramoi 1988: 9)—in nationalist terms that were consistent with his 
and Wingti's previous statements on broadcast television. H e told Pacific 
Islands Monthly (February 1988) that: 
Newspapers have set the agenda for debate wrongly. The issue for debate 
is whether or not foreigners should control mass media in PNG. The 
argument that the Government is try ing to control the press is a red herring 
in this instance because the Government intends to establish a tribunal 
that will be very independent (see also Ramoi 1989). 
(Concerns about foreign ownership were perhaps more applicable to broadcast 
television than any other media, though it is pertinent to remember that the Post-
Courier is owned by Rupert Murdoch's N e w s Ltd through one of its many 
subsidiaries.) Similarly, Ramoi told a public seminar on "Media and Develop-
ment," hosted by the Institute of National Affairs in February 1988, that: 
. . .the concept of a mass media regulatory body must be seen as a 
manifestation of our political will, in the face of failed expectations, to 
determine the destiny of our nation by moulding a national character that 
can be described as Papua New Guinean as envisaged in the preamble to 
our Constitution; and not to allow the media to foster false hope and 
expectation among our people as a result of their pursuit of profits. 
Secondly, it must be seen as the continuation of a process of distributing 
"modern wealth" in a more equitable manner—from the control of 
foreigners and foreign managers to a new class of Papua N e w Guinean 
managers and entrepreneurs (Ramoi 1988:9). 
Ramoi specifically addressed Somare's criticism, noting the Government's 
sensitivity to Section 46 of the Constitution and asserting the lawfulness of the 




Government's attempt to regulate — not 
restrict — "free speech" (Ramoi 1988:11). 
He even qualified his own statements some-
what by welcoming foreign investment "in 
the dynamic sector of the economy such as 
mining and fishing industries" and restrict-
ing the Government's attempt to reduce for-
eign ownership to "the service sector," of 
which the mass media were a part. 
The print media maintained their firm 
opposition to the proposed bill right up until 
the first Parliamentary sitting of 1988 in 
April, when the bill was scheduled to be 
introduced (see Horsfield 1990:205). As 
Horsfield (1990:206) points out, the two 
television companies did not join in the press 
campaign against the bill. Indeed, Ramoi 
(1988:10) claimed in his remarks to the NIA 
seminar that E M T V "accepts the general 
terms of the proposed bill" and endorses the 
concept of a tribunal acting "in the interests of 'a service to Papu  N e w Guinea hat ib th benef ial to the ou try and comm r-cially viable in nature.'" Horsfield sp culates hat tel vis on companiemaintained a low profile at the time beca se "the r i teres s, here applicable, were be ng adequately s rved by the persist n  and h gh y vocal press c mp gnand p rtly because. . .both compani s w e no oppos d in pri ciple to thoncept of government regulation which r cognised n ed to p ot t ubl ci ter s in th  socio-cu tural spher " (1990:206).In February 1988, PIM re ort t 'Th  pp si io  se s th  issu [ f he ia b ll] s a o l uns a  he Wingti G ver m n wi vot o nofid ce in the Apr l sit ing f parl am " (S n e 1988:22). Bu  d spiW g i' s admo iti n hat he deb t ov r h b ll ad ajor cons qu nces o  the G v rnm nt, Ram i con nu o atta k th  m d a, l ging n w eks b foreP m t wa to s t "a m jor c nspi cy to d s lis a d rem ve an electedg fr m f c (q ot d in Dorn y 1990:242). Th A il i ing wabor ed r th e ho rs o avoi v te of o conf d nce aga nst Gov rnPACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 5:1 1998 71
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ment; the media bill was removed by Wingti from the parliamentary agenda. 
Three months later, when Parliament next met, the Wingti Government was 
replaced by the Namaliu Government in a parliamentary vote. The Namaliu 
Government promised, among other things, a more favorable social and 
economic climate for foreign investment in P N G . 
The return and re-exit of Wingti 
I am uncertain at this point if the Namaliu Government initiated any new policy 
efforts in the area of broadcast television or mass media in general (but I note 
in this regard how Brown Sinamoi repeated the findings of the Kalo Report 
almost verbatim in the 1989 speech cited at the beginning of this article). I am 
also uncertain about the overall volume and shape of T V talk during the years 
of the Namaliu Government (1988-1992). These are topics for further research. 
The Department of Information and Communication — abolished since 
Independence in 1975 — was reestablished in August 1992 by the new Wingti 
Government formed after the June elections. In November, "the Secretary of the 
Department was instructed to start the process of policy formulation" (PNG 
1993:v). A fourteen member advisory committee was established and a public 
awareness campaign—including a National Communications Policy Seminar 
(Philpott 1993) — was begun by Communications Minister Martin Thompson 
in early 1993. According to Robie (1995a:91; see also the preamble of the 
National Policy on Information and Communication), the committee was asked 
to apply the following "fundamental principles": 
1. Everybody has a right to be 'dynamically involved' in the processes 
of development. 
2. Everybody should have the right to access to information and 
communication. 
3. Access to information and communication should be equitable as 
possible. 
4. A national communication system should be 'comprehensive, varied 
and flexible enough' to meet the demands of all. 
5. Communication processes should be 'free from domination by 
individuals or groups, whether foreign or local, state or private,' and 
should respect everybody's interests. 
6. Communication processes should contribute wherever possible to: (a) 
development of the whole person; (b) national identity And unity; (c) 
cultural preservation and enrichment; (d) democratic political processes; 
(e) self-reliance; and (f) environmental protection. 
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7. Some degree of supervision by the Government is necessary to protect 
human rights and achieve national goals. 
The reaction to this turn of events on the part of the print media was again one 
of trepidation, particularly over Thompson's call for a Journalists Registration 
Board (see Robie 1995a: 91 ff for details). It apparently did not help matters that 
the proposal for such a board was mooted "after a team from PNG's Department 
of Information and Communication returned from a fact-finding visit to 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore" (Robie 1995a:93). But when the final 
policy (PNG 1993) was presented in Parliament in February, 1994, it contained 
nothing about a registration board and little in the way of the harsh measures that 
many journalists, at least, feared. In fact, the National Policy on Information and 
Communications explicitly states in its Preamble that: " W e acknowledge that 
communication is a right equal with all other rights. It includes the right to 
inform and to be informed, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to 
freedom of information and assembly, and the right to communication oppor-
tunities. It is subject only to the rights of others under the National Constitution" 
(PNG 1993:7). While the policy thus broadly addresses many of the same 
concerns as both the Kalo Report and Ramoi's Mass Media Tribunal Bill, it does 
so in a way that poses no crude threat to constitutional guarantees. 
In retrospect, however, the fears of the print media — I am unaware of the 
reactions of broadcast media, including E M TV, as well as of other segments of 
the P N G citizenry — seem more than warranted. First of all, the attempt to 
formulate a national policy on communications and information came at a time 
when the Wingti Government was to all appearances moving in the direction of 
authoritarianism. Bill Standish (1994:66) notes that: 
Measures recently sought by the Wingti government have gone much 
further than those of its predecessor, and include three major bills: one to 
reverse the onus of proof in certain types of criminal case; one to allow 
the courts to deny bail to a large category of accused persons; and one to 
create a system of national registration and personal identity cards. The 
1993 legislation added to concern among some in political circles that the 
Wingti government was becoming increasingly authoritarian, seeking to 
gather all state power into the executive and use it to exclude any 
opposition at national or provincial levels. Such concerns were again 
expressed after Mr. Wingti's resignation and instant re-election tactic of 
24 September 1993. Designed to extend his tenure of office, this move 
was described by his political opponents... as a 'constitutional coup', the 
act of a 'dictator' seeking a 'guided democracy' and lifetime rule. 
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Secondly, the actions of both Minister Thompson and Wingti himself with 
respect to the mass media grossly contradicted the stated ideals of the National 
Policy. In April 1994, for example, Thompson banned the National Broadcast-
ing Commission from reporting on a conference of premiers from the Islands 
region who were discussing draft legislation for the creation of a new "Federated 
Melanesian Republic." Invoking the principle of national unity, Thompson 
explained: ". . .that whilst it is our duty to provide balanced, objective, and 
impartial broadcasting service, it is paramount that such services should reflect 
our drive for national unity and that we should take extreme care in broadcasting 
material that could inflame racial or sectional feeling" (quoted in Hiambohn 
1994:192). 
Perhaps more incredible, at least symbolically so, was the support that 
Wingti gave to the launching of a the new daily newspaper, The National, in late 
1993. Despite its name, and its promotional slogan: 'The National speaks for 
P N G " — The National is majority owned by a subsidiary company of the huge 
Malaysian timber group, Rimbunan Hijau, the single largest forestry develop-
ment company in Papua N e w Guinea (see Robie 1995b:31). Media critics and 
opposition politicians were quick to point out the manifest conflict of interest, 
some challenging Wingti to declare any interest of his own in the paper. Wingti 
commented at the launch of the paper that the country would benefit from the 
competition between two dailies and he noted that freedom of expression was 
rightly guaranteed by the constitution and that everyone should fight to uphold 
this freedom (Times of PNG, 11 November 1993). 
Robie (1995a:94) reports that there was some initial criticism and public 
debate about the NPIC soon after it was tabled in Parliament. Hiambohn 
(1995:196) quotes former Attorney-General and prominent intellectual Bernard 
Narokobi as dismissing NPIC in parliamentary debate as a policy of "misinfor-
mation and non-communication": "I am not going to burn this report because it 
does not have any substance. . . .It has simply been written by fools." But 
scrutiny of the policy appeared to have faded before the August declaration of 
Wingti's resignation-re-election tactic as unconstitutional (see, however, the 
discussion in the inaugural issue of Pacific Journalism Review). That declara-
tion resulted in the election of Sir Julius Chan as Prime Minister in a new 
coalition government. 
Conclusion: The search for policy in a weak state 
In concluding, I can do no better than to take up some of the conclusions 
74 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 5:1 1999 
y 
PNG TV 
presented by Horsfield (1990) in her most useful M A thesis on the introduction 
of broadcast television into P N G . Writing about the ultimate failure of the Mass 
Media Bill in 1988, Horsfield comments: 
The failure of this most recent attempt to apply some form of government 
control to the so-called 'culture industries' reflects the continued inability 
of the Papua New Guinea government to assert its will in matters of 
policy—especially in policy where foreign investment is involved, as 
was the case with the largely foreign-owned Papua New Guinea press 
(1990:168). 
In Horsfield's view, the failure of the P N G government to implement policy is 
not only an index of its dependent position in the global capitalist economy. It 
is also an index of the weakness — or softness, or broken-backedness (see 
Standish 1994) — of the P N G state. 
The reasons for the nation-state's weakness are many, but the course of T V 
talk over the last ten years reveals one reason in particular: the sacrifice of long 
term state-building—of policy formulation, for instance—to the immediate 
demands of electoral strategy (see Strathern 1993). This situation has produced 
large gaps between public service and politics, between the talk of politicians 
about the media, especially broadcast television, and their actions. Thus 
Somare's decision to hurry the introduction of broadcast television ignored all 
the official findings of every previous inquiry into the matter. Electoral 
considerations of deli vering economic development seemed paramount. Wingti's 
rise to political prominence was aided by his opportunity to expose the gap 
between Somare's talk about TV's "educational" role and the grim realities of 
programing on N T N . But Wingti's own attempts to set policy for the media 
drifted increasingly far away from his talk about agrarian democracy, constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights, and the importance of local ownership. Given the 
famous instability of the political process in P N G , policy formation, let alone 
implementation, is a reflex of more urgent efforts to avoid or survive changes 
of government. N o doubt the same observation could be made regarding state 
policies on logging and mining industries, industries like media in which the 
circuits of capital are rarely national. 
But this observation perhaps directs attention away from diagnoses of weak 
states to the "tension between the national and international character of the 
state" exacerbated by "the centralisation and concentration of capital" in media 
(Scott MacWilliam, personal communication). Witness in this regard the 
struggles of "strong states" such as Australia in formulating a national policy on 
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media ownership (or the history of contests and qualifications surrounding the 
P N G Commercial Advertising Act, passed in 1985 to nationalize ownership and 
control of the advertising industry). The observation also directs attention to 
the question of how "strong societies," for which P N G is justly famous, might 
effectively resist and engage both the national state and transnational capital. 
Anthropologists have written accounts of such engagements with respect to 
logging and mining projects in which local landowners have been able to act 
collectively and efficacioulsy (see, e.g., Biersack 1995). With respect to 
broadcast television, however, the much touted strength of PNG's indigenous 
societies to determine their futures appears to be severely compromised—if not 
by a weak national state, then by the agents and agencies (both domestic and 
foreign) of a strong global market. 
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